



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

ONI DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

7 FEB 1951

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director of Central Intelligence.
(Attn: [REDACTED])

Subj: NIE-29: Yugoslavia, Contributions to.

Ref: (a) CIA Asst. Director of National Estimates memo
dated 2 Feb 1951, same subject.

Review of this document by CIA has
determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S O
Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 24 Feb 81 Reviewer 6514

1. The following information is submitted as pertinent to the indicated
sections of terms of reference:

II - D. Military Vulnerability

Reliability of the Navy to present Yugoslav regime.

The Yugoslav Navy is directly subordinate to the Minister of
National Defense under Chief of Staff Colonel General Popovic. At present,
the Navy may be regarded as merely a component of and subordinate to the
Army.

The Yugoslav naval forces are considered to be reliable to
the present regime for the following reasons:

(1) The Yugoslav Navy is a comparatively small force and as
a result it is subject to close supervision by the security forces.

(2) Less than 5% of the officer personnel are pre-war Royal
Yugoslav naval officers retained on the strength of their experience; the
remainder are former petty officers of the former Royal Navy, and partisan
officers who received their commissioned rank for war service and for their
activities with the Communist Party. The former Royal Naval officers on
active duty are looked upon with suspicion and they are under close sur-
veillance. Consequently, political loyalty rather than professional quali-
fication is a matter of prime interest in the post-war Yugoslav Navy, and
this is particularly true in selecting new officers.

III. Soviet and satellite economic, political and military pressures
against Yugoslavia in 1951.

Effect of these pressures on Yugoslav Navy

It is expected that the USSR and her satellites will continue

25X1A

FEB 7 1951
NE-11



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-322H/rwt
Ser 3201/001124

7 FEB 1951

SECRET

to exert political, economic and military pressures against Yugoslavia during 1951. The Yugoslav Navy unquestionably suffered from the economic blockade imposed by the Cominform countries. As a result the Yugoslav leaders had to turn to the West in order to import the necessary fuel and propulsion machinery for the maintenance and construction of naval vessels. At present, due to lack of foreign exchange, the Yugoslav Navy is handicapped to some extent. However, it is felt that if Tito asks for spare parts, oil and additional propulsion machinery, the West will probably furnish such aid. Provided military assistance is forthcoming, it is estimated that the continuation of the Cominform economic blockade will not further hamper the Yugoslav Naval Forces.

IV. Can the USSR and Satellites destroy the Tito regime by invasion in 1951?

Naval Invasion

A. Under no circumstances will Soviet naval action alone play a paramount role in bringing about the downfall of the Tito regime. It is to be noted, however, that access to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Fleet would probably mean a considerable reduction of Western aid by sea to Yugoslavia.

B. At present the capabilities of satellite naval forces against Yugoslavia are considered negligible.

C. Naval capabilities for resisting invasion.

(1) Yugoslav Naval Units

- 4 Coastal Destroyers - good condition - operational
- 2 Old Patrol Craft - good condition - operational
- 3 Coastal Submarines - 2 operational - 1 non-operational
- 20 Motor Torpedo Boats (at least) - all operational
- 7 Torpedo Boats (ex-U.S.)
- 18 Minesweepers

1 Mineslayer

Plus several patrol craft, auxiliary vessels and numerous landing craft.

1 DD (Building - "SPLIT") - 70% complete

2 GDD's (being reconstructed) - 60% complete - small

The combat efficiency of the Yugoslav Navy is considered to be poor.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-322N/rwt
Ser 3221/001124

7 FEB 1951

SECRET

(2) Long term policy envisages an offensive-defensive system based on the employment of small coastal destroyers, motor torpedo boats and coastal submarines. In 1951 the uncompleted vessels listed in paragraph C-(1) could become operational if Western aid is given. The number of PT boats could also be increased considerably with the help of the West.

(3) Yugoslav naval forces are capable of successfully opposing any satellite naval invasion; however, against a determined Soviet naval attack, Yugoslavia's naval resistance would be negligible (assuming Soviet naval forces have access to the Mediterranean).

V. Is direct attack upon Yugoslavia by USSR or Satellites likely in 1951?

Naval Attack

A. No indications.

B. Reasons.

(1) For an attack:

- a. To gain access to the Mediterranean Sea.
- b. To establish naval operating bases in the strategic and well protected coast and islands of the Dalmatian coast.

(2) Against an attack:

- a. The Soviet Union Naval Forces do not presently have access to the Mediterranean.
- b. A forced passage of the Turkish Straits by Russian naval units would have serious international consequences.

R. H. RUDGEPS,
by direction.